

*AK chron*ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY**SECRET****INFORMATION**

November 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER**FROM:** Arnold Nachmanoff MORI C05138716**SUBJECT:** Castro's View of the US and Fears of Invasion

Attached at Tab A is an intelligence report which, if accurate, gives an interesting insight into Castro's views of the US and his fears about invasion as well as his potential reaction to it.

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the Secretary General of the PVP, Manual Mora Valverde, met with Fidel Castro in Cuba in late October. Mora had traveled to Cuba in an effort to secure the release of a hijacked Costa Rican Airlines (LACSA) plane, and also to discuss on his own account reports of the establishment of military bases in Costa Rica for use against Cuba.

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Mora assured Castro that President Figueres of Costa Rica is not hostile to Castro or Cuba, and that his strongly anti-Castro statements are for public consumption only and not his real view. He also assured Castro that Figueres would never provide facilities for military actions against Cuba. In response Castro:

- Was very abusive about Figueres saying he intended to delay returning the LACSA plane and to charge at least \$50,000 for "repairs".
- Explained that Figueres' anti-Cuba statements were important to him because he believed that the US is preparing another invasion of Cuba.
- Added that Cuba's attitude toward invasion has changed; that Cuba will no longer wait for invasion as in the case of the Bay of Pigs but will "...attack... and carry on the war until the Soviet Union is drawn into it."

Castro's concern over invasion may arise from recent efforts by Cuban exile groups to gain cooperation and facilities from some Central American governments for actions against Cuba, efforts he is almost certainly aware of. His vehemence, if the report is accurate, could lead him to ill-considered actions tending to create a confrontation between the US and Cuba and/or the USSR. Castro may be

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- 2 -

reacting in part to pressures from the Russians and their Cuban allies in the Castro Government designed to ease him out of his position of preeminence as suggested by Pete Vaky in his memo to you of November 6.

Attachment:

Tab A - Intelligence Report

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